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INTRODUCTION

Our era has been called the "age of flexibility." The need for flexibility is what is said to be driving the new economy, and in turn, driving new policies, new regulatory approaches, and more
experimentation with alternative forms of governance. The question
of how to deal with new flexible arrangements in the context of employment usually raises strong reactions from legal scholars, ranging
from harsh opposition to enthusiastic support. Yet, it is first important to emphasize that the question of what is "flexibility" is itself
complex and open to debate. Do less regulatory protections for workers provide more or less flexibility in the market? The answer depends on your perspective. Employers gain perhaps a greater range
of possibilities for how to construe their employment arrangements,
but some workers may find themselves with less bargaining power and
less flexibility in choosing their vocational paths.
A recent report by the International Labor Organization (ILO) describes flexibility as a "nebulous term" that tends to embody a range
t Clark Byse Fellow, Harvard Law School; Hauser Doctoral Fellow, Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University. olobel@law.harvard.edu.
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of meanings, some of them conflicting.1 From the perspective of businesses, the new market is understood to be driven by the need for
greater flexibility, that is, the ability to respond, adjust, and adapt rapidly and dynamically to changing environments and conditions.' To
this end, flexibility is found in various forms of the economic enterprise. The type of flexibility primarily invoked in the context of employment relations is 3defined in industrial organization literature as
"numericalflexibility." This refers to the dynamic adjustment of the
number of workers who are employed by the firm, variations in the
size of the workforce by employment arrangements, or usages of labor
that do not produce a traditional employment relationship.4 Under
numerical flexibility, economists differentiate between (a) external numericalflexibility, the adjustment of employees through dynamic hiring and firing,5 and (b) externalization, which involves the use of the
labor of enterprises or individuals who have not entered into an employment contract with the firm.6 Internal numericalflexibility (sometimes referred to as temporal flexibility) is the practice that allows
greater variation in work schedules, or flextime routes, even for core
workers.7 All of these variations consist of what is often referred to as
the move from stable to contingent employment.
A related but broader type of flexibility involves management and
production processes of the enterprise. The lessening of limitations
that are imposed on the ways a firm can act creates decision-making
flexibility. For example, the ease and range of the practices it employs, in order to recruit and hire new workers, as well as to utilize,
order, and fire existing workers. This type of flexibility also involves
the ability to diversify other management and market practices. For
1. SHAUNA L. OLNEY, UNIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN SELECTED INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 42 (1996).

2. Paul Miller, Strategy and the Ethical Management of Human Resources, 6
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. J. 5, 13 (1996).

3. See, e.g., BENNETT HARRISON, LEAN AND MEAN 130 (1994). See also Brian
Easton, Symposium on New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act, 28 CAL W. INT'L
L.J. 209, 216 (1997) (citing Bernard Brunhes, Labour Flexibility in Enterprises: A
Comparision of Firms in Four Eupropean Countries, in LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY: TRENDS IN ENTERPRISES 13 (1989). The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) "defines the following five types of flexibility: (1) External numerical flexibility: the number of employees is adjusted" (2) "Externalisation:
part of the firm's work is provided by enterprises or individuals who" have not entered into an employment contract with the firm; (3) Internal numerical flexibility:
adjustment of the number of working hours, "the number of workers remains unchanged; (4) Functional flexibility:" job assignments are dynamically adjusted; (5)
"Wage flexibility: labour costs, and thus wages, are adjusted." Id.
4. Easton, supra note 3, at 216.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Brunhes, supra note 3, at 14-15 (1989). See generally Drago et al, The Willingness-to-Pay for Work/Family Policies: A Study of Teachers, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 22 (2001) (discussing flexibility and work/family policies-cost-benefit analysis
and willingness to pay from employer and employee sides).
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example, managerial flexibility may include shifts to less hierarchical
organization of work, including decentralization, use of self-managedteams, and participatory processes. Other examples include wage flexibility (sometimes called "pay flexibility"), which involves a shift to
more individualized wage differentials, based on economic fluctuations, changing demand, merit, and measures of performance; 8 and assignment flexibility that allows a company to use workers for a larger
number of tasks.9
It is easy from this perspective to collapse economic flexibility with
a no-regulation or a freedom of contract regime, assuming that less
statutory regulation always increases flexibility in the market. However, it is important to emphasize that even from a market perspective, this is not necessarily the case. According to an ILO report,
"'deregulation' and 'flexibility' are 'more opposite ... than synonymous."'° While such a strong statement might be contested, the
range of possibilities for flexibility challenges an opposite conclusion.
The enabling function of a regulatory regime is necessary for the regular operation of any market.
Courts facing these changes have had to deal with questions of flexibility and the ways it may affect differently situated individuals and
groups in the new economy. In the following sections, this Article
focuses on a particular set of "flexibilization" arrangements in the employment relationship-the use of a third party labor intermediary for
the supply of workers to a firm. While the concept of flexibility is
often used as a buzzword for a range of developments in the new
economy, we will continue to draw attention to the fact that flexibility
and stability are always relative, existing in some form and degree in
any organizational structure. The questions that policy makers must
first ask when faced with claims about the necessity, legality, and desirability of flexibility is: flexible in what way and compared to what
other possibilities? The range of flexible arrangements in the labor
market that have developed in recent years is vast.
This Article argues for the need for new laws and adequate guidelines for today's flexible staffing arrangements. Flexible employment
arrangements in the new market are simultaneously efficiency-driven
and developed through continuous political and legal action. While
the employment agency industry is potentially a welfare-enhancing
8. See Yves Stevens & Bea Van Buggenhout, The Influence of Flexibility as a
Motor of Changing Work Patterns on OccupationalPensions as Part of Social Protection in Europe, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 331, 335-36 (2000); Tiziano Treu, Labor
Flexibility in Europe, 131 INT'L LAB. REV. 497, 507-08 (1992).
9. See J. WILLIAM PFEIFFER, THE 1994 ANNUAL: DEVELOPING HUMAN RESOURCES 79-80 (J. William Pfeiffer ed., 1994).
10. OLNEY, supra note 1, at 60 n.4 (citation omitted). Olney explains that this is
because "deregulation stimulates labor turnover and a reduction of the core
workforce, diminishing the incentive to provide the training needed to raise productivity based on worker innovation." Id.
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sector in certain environments, it also produces new forms of mistreatment of workers in the absence of adequate regulatory incentives.
These new economic structures necessitate the development of a new
normative model that allows certain forms of market flexibility yet
maintains the social norms that continue to inform fair employment
policies.
Part 11 of this Article explores the range of taxonomies and categories that have developed in the flexible staffing industry. This Article
sets forth the argument that the complexity and variety that characterize the industry is not accidental, but a product of legal and economic
struggles for recognition of flexible employment arrangements as legitimate practices in the new economy. Part III further describes the
various factors that motivate the emergence of flexible employment
from the perspective of employers and workers. These factors include
both legitimate economic needs and problematic attempts to evade
legal protections. Part IV then moves to a third set of factors that
motivate flexible staffing arrangements-those of the flourishing employment agency industry. This Part further describes the public efforts of the staffing industry to legitimize its status in the triangular
employment context, including the advocacy, lobbying, and public relations efforts by its trade associations. Part V is an analysis of the
recent efforts by courts, administrative agencies, and legislative commissions to define the legal parameters of the various new flexible
employment arrangements. Drawing on comparative insights, as well
as the problems and inconsistencies among recent cases, Part V demonstrates the inadequacies of the existing common law doctrine in addressing these new challenges and suggests alternative doctrines and
policies that would be better suited to achieve the necessary balance
between flexibility and fairness.
II.

TAXONOMY AND CATEGORIZATION OF FLEXIBLE
STAFFING ARRANGEMENTS

The new economy, marked by a dramatic decline in unionization
and rapid changes in production patterns, and driven by other things
such as technological advances and globalization, has brought new
forms of work and employment." Within these realities, the traditional firm is no longer the sole employer in the market. As businesses seek more flexibility in their hiring and production practices,
they increasingly utilize a variety of subsequent firms to meet their
changing employment needs. More and more workers find themselves seeking work through a third-party employment agency. The
11. See Orly Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations:
Four Dimension of Power in Shifting Patterns of Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
121, 148 (2001).
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temporary help industry is rapidly growing.' 2 An illustration of the
scope of the employment agency industry is that Manpower, Inc. has
single largest private employer in the United
been reported to be the
13
States in recent years.
The taxonomy of the flexible staffing industry is vast. At times referred to as "placement agencies," "staffing agencies," "referral agencies," "leasing firms," "temporary help agencies," "manpower
agencies," "temp-hiring firms," "labor-only contractors," "employee
leasing," "vendors," "temporary services," "contract management,"
"facilities management," "day labor providers," "labor contracting
firms," "technical services suppliers," "job shops," "search firms," and
most recently, "professional employer organization" (PEO). This
multiplicity of different terms indicates the different functions, classifications, self-definition, legal statuses, and conceptual differentiation
of the roles and responsibilities of these enterprises operating within
the labor market. The long list is not accidental. It reflects the struggle for flexibility in flexible work arrangements. In turn, it relates to,
and produces an equally long list of worker terminology, ranging from
employees," through the oxymoron,
"temporary 'agency
"permatemps," 14 to "self-employed," "freelancers," and "independent
contractors." In turn, a taxonomy is produced referring to the "client," "contractor," "labor-user," "special employer," or traditional
employer, who uses a flexible staffing arrangement.
Again, the long taxonomy is not accidental. In fact, the re-labeled
workers who have already been company employees for several years
represent a high percentage of contingent work. 5 Many of these relabeling processes involve the usage of a third-party intermediary, the
complex offspring of the traditional employment agency. Three main
categories emerge within the employment agency industry. The first
category is the traditional agency, which the Author generally terms as
the referral-placementservice, involves a simple listing of job openings
for job seekers. 6 The second category, the staffing, or temporary help
agency, is an enterprise that has an available pool of workers that it
sends out to replace absent employees or for short-term positions in a
12. Mark H. Grunewald, The Regulatory Future of Contingent Employment: An
Introduction, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 725, 727 (1995); Anne E. Polivka, Contingent
Workers & Alternate Work Arrangements, Defined, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3 (1996).
13. Janice Castro, Disposable Workers, Time, Mar. 29, 1993 at 43, 43.
14. See John Cook, Microsoft Limits Amount of Time Temps Can Work: New Policy Could End Its 'Permatemp' Problem, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 19,
2000, at B3.
15. See Judith E. Bendich, When Is a Temp Not a Temp?, TRIAL, Oct. 2001, at 42,
43.
16. See generally Orly Lobel, Class and Care: The Roles of Private Intermediaries
in the In-home Care Industry in the United States and Israel, 24 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
89 (2001) (exploring formal and informal groups and organizations that serve as a link
between employers and in-home core jobs in the United States and Israel).
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workplace. 7 The third category, the leasing firm, otherwise self-defined as the PEO, is a company which assumes responsibility for payroll, benefits, and other human resource functions of the long-term
workers of another workplace and is set up with the particular purpose of becoming a surrogate employer.18
These different categories have emerged through economic arrangements and legal battles. Early on, the first type of enterprise, the
referral agency, was regulated by most states and was required to obtain a state license, based on evidence of "good character" or community need, to post bond, and to keep records for inspection. 19 Some
states also regulated maximum placement fees and prohibited misrepresentation or referral to workplaces in which there was a labor dispute in progress.2z
The two latter types of enterprises, the staffing and leasing agencies,
have struggled to distinguish themselves from this first category, in
order (a) not to be classified as employment agencies, so as to avoid
state regulation of this earlier category; and, more importantly, (b) to
be classified as the employers of the workers, so that the user-client of
these workers will avoid such classification.2 1 Therefore, in some
sense, and as demonstrated in other papers in this Symposium, these
new economic realities have flipped the contract/status dilemma.
While in the past, the move from status to contract was seen as a liberating move for workers, it is the worker today who is struggling to
maintain the status of employee. Legislatures and courts continue the
attempt to balance between the status and contract spectrum and to
sort between legitimate and illegitimate arrangements.

17. See American Staffing Association, ASA Staffing Facts, at http://
www.staffingtoday.net/aboutasa/staffingfacts.shtm (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) (on file
with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review). The American Staffing Association was
formely called the National Association of Temporary Services. American Staffing
Association, ASA Brief History, at http://www.staffingtoday.net/aboutasa/asahistory.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
18. See Carrie Aaron, PEO Census 2000 Results!, 3 PEO Network Inc., at http://
www.Peonetwork.com/articles/2000_peocensus.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2003) (on file
with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
19. George Gonos, The Contest Over "Employee" Status in the Postwar United
States: The Case of Temporary Help Firms, 31 L. & Soc'v REV. 81, 90 n.12 (1997).
20. Id. Compare Olasen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1941) (allowing regulation of fees charged by employment agencies), with Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590,
596-97 (1917) (holding unconstitutional a law prohibiting private employment agencies from charging a fee to employees).
21. MARTHA I. FINNEY & DEBORAH A. DASCH, A HERITAGE OF SERVICE: THE
HISTORY OF TEMPORARY HELP 86 (1991); Gonos, supra note 19, at 90. See Mack A.
Moore, Proposed Federal Legislationfor Temporary Labor Service, 26 LAB. L.J. 767,
767 (1975).
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III.

FACTORS THAT MOTIVATE FLEXIBLE
STAFFING ARRANGEMENTS

The question of differentiation between economic needs of firms
and the desire to evade the law is a difficult one in the context of
flexible staffing, even more so given the many different types and constructs that have recently emerged. Flexible employment has become
widespread as a result of many different factors. The immediate explanation that is provided by economists is that flexible work is a response to the new economic challenges posed by technology and
global competition.2 2 The use of contingent workers allows employers
to meet fluctuating production needs caused by rapid shifts in demand
as well as the implementation of new technologies. The supply of contingent work allows increased hiring during periods of economic prosperity, while at times of cutbacks, employers can downsize without
exposing core workers to layoffs. 23 The same is done to meet the particular short-term needs of the company. Thus, employers downsize,
or in its updated, indeed legitimizing, version, "rightsize," their firms
into leaner organizations by using flexible staffing arrangements and
third-party intermediaries. In terms of efficient human resource management, the use of intermediaries often allows employers to reduce
administrative costs. It may also help employers evaluate employees
before hiring them on a regular basis.
From a legal perspective, flexible staffing arrangements, when legally approved, allow employers to avoid employer status with respect
to some of their workers, thus reducing the number of employees covered by a collective agreement, where one exists, or reducing the number of employees covered by certain statutory provisions and benefit
plans. The desire to avoid employee protection policies raises significant concerns. The tactic of setting up third party intermediaries to
avoid the status of employer is called "payrolling" in the business
world.24 By creating a double-tiered workforce, employers are often
thought to be designing a subterfuge structure in order to avoid paying benefits to some of their less critical employees while retaining
more valuable employees under the traditional array of employee
standards. From the perspective of workers, such contingency in employment relations, especially when created by a unilateral restructuring of the workforce by an employer, violates the social contract
between employers and workers, which has historically included the
recognition that the employment relationship carries with it certain
social provisions, opportunities, and rights.2 5 This not only creates a
22. Steven J. Arsenault et. al, An Employee by Any Other Name Does Not Smell
as Sweet: A Continuing Drama, 16 LAB. L.J. 285, 285-86 (2000).
23. See id. at 286.
24. See Bendich, supra note 15, at 42.
25. Brian K. Steverson, Temporary Employment and the Social Contract, ONLINE

J. ETHICS 1-2 (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
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group of second-class workers, but may also have an effect on the core
labor relations, as employers constantly have an available supply of
leased employees with lowered expectations.2 6
While economic justifications are regularly advanced to explain the
increase of these arrangements, it has been well recognized that some
employers use contingent work arrangements precisely for avoiding
employer-related responsibilities and in order to circumvent employment and labor laws. In fact, some scholars have characterized the
user-employer's evasion of responsibility as the raison d'etre of intermediary employment agencies.2 7 Indeed, a report of the U.S. Department of Labor concludes that many firms make use of different types
of contingent work "not for the sake of ...efficiency but in order to
28
evade their legal obligations.
These are all demand side factors, that is, motivation from the perspective of businesses used for flexible staffing arrangements. On the
supply side, the dilemma is similarly a real one. It should be understood that, from the perspective of workers, a unified description of a
contingent workforce is misleading. Contingent workers are often
vulnerable workers, disproportionately consisting of minorities and
women, and most often working in low-skilled, low-wage jobs. 9 Recent studies suggest that workers of temporary employment agencies
generally earn less than workers in similar positions that are employed
26. See, e.g., Frances Raday, The Insider-Outsider Politics of Labor-Only Contracting,20 CoMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 413, 443 (1999).
27. See Sergio Ricca, Private Temporary Work Organization and Public Employment Services: Effects and Problems of Coexistence, 121 INT'L LAB. REV. 141, 147-48
(1982). It is not rare to find highly negative accounts of the intermediary industry by
labor lawyers, such as the following:
Labor-only contracting produces a special potential for commercial exploitation. The contractors need almost no resources to set up "business"-essentially, a telephone will do. The primary requisite for success is
unemployment which provides the "raw material" for such ventures. The
profit margin is assured by the lowering of employees' wages and conditions.
The labor-contractor's employee is especially vulnerable. The employee will
not be covered or protected by any workplace-specific benefits for in-house
employees since, even if classified as an employee and entitled to employee
protection, he or she will not be the user's employee and will not be entitled
to the wages and conditions guaranteed for the user's employees by collective agreements, extension orders, or workplace regulations. In this, the labor-contractor's employee is disadvantaged even vis-A-vis other contingent
workers who, once classified as employees, will become entitled to the same
benefits as all other in-house employees.
Raday, supra note 26, at 416.
28. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE DUNLOP COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT 36 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP
COMM'N].

29. See generally Lobel, supra note 16, for a discussion on the multiple vulnerabili-

ties of migrant women who suffer the disadvantages of working in informal underground economies and performing invisible, undervalued core work.
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in a traditional dual relationship. 30 Contingency in their hiring arrangements is thus understood to institutionalize "a virtually continuous bidding process," leading to a constant downward pressure on
wages.3 Yet, it is also important to realize that certain contingent
workers are in fact relatively powerful players in the market-such as
highly skilled professional freelancers or consultants who prefer to
maintain their independence and work for several workplaces on a
contingent basis and with individualized contracts. 32 Employment
agencies are becoming increasingly specialized and target particular
industries, such as the well-paid high-tech professionals, or the generally more vulnerable health care workers. 33 The workers employed in
such arrangements are no longer only low-wage low-skill workers, but
include technicians, software programmers, engineers, artists, accountants, paralegals, and even lawyers.34
Even within the range of the majority of contingent workers, who
have relatively little bargaining power, it is significant to note that
some groups find the availability of the contingent employment option
desirable for a variety of reasons, including the ability to work and
attend to family demands, schooling and work combinations,3 5 and
"moonlighting" opportunities to increase their earnings. Alongside
these interests however, many of those who work in a contingent
form, or are simply labeled that way, are in fact people interested in
full-time, conventional employment.

IV.

EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AS FORCEFUL THIRD-PARTY

ACTORS: DIRECT EFFORTS TO LEGITIMIZE THE INDUSTRY

In addition to the demand and supply factors, the third factor that
interacts with and complicates these different competing forces is the
impact that the rapid spread of third-party intermediaries has had on
the market. The appearance of intermediaries has not only served as
an enabling mechanism for efficient implementation of contingent
work patterns, but also has been a driving force behind the increased
triangulation of employment relations. Employment agencies are
themselves industries with economic interests that cannot be conflated
30. See Sharon R. Cohany et al., Counting the Workers: Results of a First Survey, in
IN TRANSITION 41, 51
(Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998).
31. Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1527, 1532 (1996).
32. Eileen Silverstein & Peter Goselin, Intentionally Impermanent Employment
and the Paradox of Productivity, 26 STETSON L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
33. Id. at 12 (citing Susan Diesenthouse, In a Shaky Economy, Even Professionals
are 'Temps', N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1993, at F5).
34. Diesenthouse, supra note 33, at F5.
35. See PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
NEW LABOR MARKET 51 (2001) (arguing that teens do not deserve the same kind of
protection when working in summer jobs as other contingent workers who support a
family).
CONTINGENT WORK: AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
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with either side of the traditional dual relationship. Indeed, these industries have actively pointed to several valid reasons why their growing significance in the labor market should be recognized. Mostly,
these reasons involve the comparative advantage of large-scale, specialized intermediaries in relation to small or medium-sized businesses. If employment agencies are flourishing industries that are
larger than the workplaces with which they contract, then they acquire
the advantage of size. Indeed, this can be understood as a self-reinforcing circle, and as mentioned earlier, firms such as Manpower, Inc.
are becoming some of the largest employers in different countries
across the world.36
The size advantage holds a range of benefits for the employment
relationship. First, small employers are likely to "pay as much as forty
percent more for employer benefits than do larger companies ...."I'
Second, compliance with the many employment and labor laws requires knowledge and expertise that small employers often lack.
Moreover, many laws, such as Title VII, the Family and Medical
Leave Act, COBRA, and the ADA, require a statutory minimum
number of employees in order for an employer to fall within their
scope.3 8 In a large number of industries, firms have become smaller
and less stable, thus making them more likely violators of fair labor
standards.39 In such contexts, imposing responsibilities on larger labor
market intermediaries, either directly as intermediaries or as employers, potentially provides more security for contingent workers. Therefore, in certain environments, employment agencies may potentially
serve to formalize the informal by increasing the availability of information, standards, fair practices, and knowledge building in the market. Third, employment agencies may well be competing over the
market share of individual contingent, employer-less workers (legally
known as "independent contractors"), not just the share of the userclient's legally recognized employees. Employment agencies routinely
enter into exclusive agreements with the user-employer that preclude
the ability of firms and workers to secure jobs except through the
agency, and thus may be increasing their share over similar dual relationships.40 If this is the case, the recognition of the role of the flexi36. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
37. Gregory L. Hammond, Flexible Staffing Trends and Legal Issues in the Emerging Workplace, 10 LAB. LAw. 161, 168 (1994).
38. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i)
(2000); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
39. See, e.g., Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a
Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 291, 295-311 (2003)
(discussing how the garment industry has become a pervasive violator of labor laws as
a result of the use of subcontractors).
40. Harris Freeman & George Gonos, Temp and Staffing Firms as Company Unions: A Sociolegal Reclassification of For-Profit Labor Market Intermediaries 5 n.5
(Oct. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review)
(citation omitted).
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ble staffing intermediary may in fact enhance employment stability
rather than flexibility. Finally, as an industry-in-itself, the employment agency operation produces its own employees that work in the
business of linking, producing a triangular transaction that benefits
government taxation. Furthermore, the operation creates a new space
that generates its own jobs, income, and culture.
Throughout its growth, the employment agency industry has struggled to legitimize itself and to gain recognition in the market and in
the public sphere. The industry has been conscious of the tensions
among the various factors that have motivated its emergence. It is
particularly conscious of the significance of legitimizing, labeling, and
achieving legal recognition. The industry has been intensely involved
in defining and redefining its sphere of existence. In the process of
defending their own existence, agencies also actively distinguish themselves from one another. In addition, the industry has been aggressively promoting the legal adoption of definitions it drafts. Finally, it
has been involved in establishing its legitimacy as an industry to sustain its role as an employer, through elaborate codes of ethics, narration of its history, and the production of statistics and studies.
Aware of the importance and power of naming, these new actors
have given much attention to categories and classifications in their
formal self-definitions. The American Staffing Association (ASA),
which according to its own reports, represents a $62 billion dollar U.S.
industry,4 1 defines itself as the voice of the staffing industry,
"promot[ing] the interests of our members through legal and legislative advocacy, public relations, education, and the establishment of
high standards of ethical conduct."4 2 Its members provide services of
"temporary help, permanent placement, temporary-to-permanent
placement, long-term and contract help, managed services (often
called "outsourcing"), training, human resources consulting, and PEO
arrangements . . . ." Founded in 1966 as the Institute of Temporary
Services, the association expanded its name in the 1970s to the National Association of Temporary Services, and in 1994, to National Association of Temporary and Staffing Services.44 The association
explained that the expansion was done because many of its members
offered more than temporary help services.45 Yet, five years later, the
41. American Staffing Association, Staffing FAQs, at http://www.staffingtoday.net/
aboutasa/staffingfaqs.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
42. American Staffing Association, About ASA, at http://www.staffingtoday.net/
aboutasa/index.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law
Review).
43. Id.
44. American Staffing Association, ASA Brief History, at http://www.staffingtoday.net/aboutasa/asahistory.htm (last visted Sept. 18, 2003) (on file with the Texas
Wesleyan Law Review).
45. Id.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

11

Texas TEXAS
Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 10 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 8

WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

name was again changed to the American Staffing Association, "to
better reflect the full range of staffing and human resources services
offered by member companies."4 6 The more recent NationalAssociation of Professional Employer Organizations(NAPEO) also changed
its name at the beginning of the 1990s from its original name, National
Staff Leasing Association (NSLA), which was founded in 1984. 4 1 This
is especially revealing since the new name captures the legal category
of employer, coupling it with the connotation of the professionalization of this status.
The name changes of the associations have been purposeful. These
organizations have been actively working with federal and state regulators to formalize and stabilize the industry. Early in the 1950s, the
question of whether temporary help agencies were employers or employment agencies was litigated in state courts mainly by Manpower,
Inc.4 s Later on, the industry negotiated with state legislatures, which
resulted in several deregulation victories.49 More recently, NAPEO
"has negotiated with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the National Council on Compensation Insurance, the Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies, the Internal
Revenue Service, the U.S. Department of Labor, and numerous other
federal and state agencies ... [and] testified in support of regulation
of the industry across the country., 5' NAPEO "has published its Positions on Key Employee Leasing Issues, which contain the association's views on a variety of issues, including COBRA group health
care coverage
continuation rights, union organizing activity," and tax51
ation issues.
46. Id.
47. Aaron, supra note 18, at 6.
48. See Gonos, supra note 19, at 91 (While Florida and Pennsylvania courts held
that Microsoft was not an employment agency but an independent contractor, Nebraska and New Jersey courts held that it was an employment agency subject to state
licensing laws and other regulations, and not the actual employer of the workers assigned to the user-employer.). Nebraska held that Manpower functioned as an intermediary in the labor market, procuring work for job applicants and supplying work to
user-employers. Nebraska v. Manpower of Omaha, 73 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Neb. 1955).
49. Id.
50. Hammond, supra note 37, at 3 n.5.
51. Id. The NSLA formulated its self-definition:
Employee leasing is a contractual relationship under which:
(1) the leasing company assigns workers to client locations, and thereby assumes responsibility as an employer of the leased workers assigned to the
client locations;
(2) direction and control of the leased employees is the right and responsibility of the leasing company and may be shared with the client, consistent with
the client's responsibility for its product or service;
(3) the leasing company pays and reports wages and employment taxes of
the leased employees out of its own accounts;
(4) the employment relationship between the leasing company and its leased
employees is intended to be long term and not temporary; and
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The industry continues to be active in advocacy and litigation. The
American Staffing Association states:
Every industry must pool its resources to deal with the myriad legislative and regulatory issues facing it. Trade associations are the
most effective way for individual companies, both large and small,
to express their views to policymakers because only the association
52
can speak for the industry as a whole. This is ASA's role.
In June 2003, the American Staffing Association submitted a long
memorandum to the U.S. Department of Labor responding to the request for public comment on the proposed rule to revamp the "whitecollar" exemption rules under the Fair Labor Standards Act, arguing
that changes in the federal overtime rules are necessary to accommodate the needs of today's flexible workforce. 53 Similarly, the association submitted a comment to the Department of Labor outlining
concerns about how some state jobs programs, under the Workforce
Investment Act unfairly compete with staffing firms and also urged
policy changes that would increase the role of staffing firms in those
programs.54 In the recent Microsoft litigation on the status of its
"leased employees," an amici curiae brief in support of Microsoft's
stance was submitted by the Information Technology Association of
America, the American Staffing Association, the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, and the National Technical Services
Association, arguing that the court's decision that the leased employees were in fact Microsoft's employees, "exposes the thousands of
businesses that use staffing firm employees for legitimate business rea(5) the leasing company retains the right to hire, reassign, and fire the leased
employees.
Employee leasing enhances regulatory compliance, expands statutory protections for employees, improves human resources risk management, and increases the availability of cost-effective benefits to employees and
businesses.
Id. at 165-66 (citation omitted).
52. American Staffing Association, About ASA-Membership Benefits at http://
www.staffingtoday.net/aboutasalbenefitdetails.htm (last visted Sept. 18, 2003) (on file
with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
53. Letter from Edward A. Lenz, Senior Vice President, American Staffing Association, to Tammy McCutcheon, Administrator, U.S. Department of Labor 1 (June 27,
2003) at http://www.staffingtoday.net/memberserv/publicaffairs/flsacomments2003.
pdf (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
54. Letter from Edward A. Lenz, Senior Vice President, American Staffing Association, to Maria Flynn, U.S. Department of Labor 1 (June 28, 2002) (on file with the
Texas Wesleyan Law Review) at http:www.staffingtoday.net/memberserv/ASAComments on WIA.pdf. See also Orly Lobel, Regulating Coexistence in the New Economy: Cross-SectorCollaboration in a Workforce Development Approach 38-41 (2003)
(unpublished Hauser Center working paper) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law
Review) (discussing the competition among private for-profit sector employment
agencies, public agencies, and the non-profit sector under the recent Workforce Investment Act).
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sons to lawsuits for retroactive
employee benefit coverage by plaintiffs
'55
looking for a windfall.
To professionalize and publicly establish its legitimacy, the industry,
and particularly its associations, include on their websites Codes of
Ethics and Professional Operating Standards that their members are
asked to adhere to. 56 The ASA Code of Ethics declares itself as being
"in the best interests" of all three sides of the triangle-workers, businesses and intermediaries-or as it describes, "of the staffing services
industry, its customers, and its employees. '57 The member agencies
are ethically required to "maintain the highest standards of ethical
conduct," and among other things to satisfy all applicable employer
obligations, including payment of the employer's share of social security, state and federal unemployment insurance taxes, and workers'
compensation-and to explain to employees that the staffing firm is
responsible for such obligations.5 8 As is evident from these various
activities, the industry is not only reacting to the needs of businesses
but is creating a market for itself by innovation, marketing, and strategic collective action. The picture that is uncovered is of an industry,
which is moving to establish its status, both economically and legally,
as the new archetypical employer.
V.

SPHERES OF CONTRACTUAL STATUSES: COMMON LAW
MEDIATES THE INTERMEDIARY

A.

The Common Law Relationship

While the industry has struggled to define itself, courts have also
grappled with defining the parameters in triangular employment relationships. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Microsoft began to fill
many of its full-time employment vacancies with what it internally referred to as "freelancers," that it wanted to legally define as "independent contractors."5 9 These workers were distinguished from
Microsoft's regular employees by a series of mostly symbolic characteristics.6" The freelancer had a different colored badge, a different
type of e-mail address, was not invited to company parties, and received a different orientation session.6 1 The wages that the freelancers received came through Microsoft's accounts payable department
55. Contingent Workforce: Court: Ruling on Contingent Staff Left Standing by
U.S. Supreme Court, 3 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 208 (Jan. 11, 2000) (citation
omitted).
56. See, e.g., American Staffing Association, Code of Ethics, at http://
www.staffingtoday.net/aboutasa/codeofethics.shtml (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) (on file
with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter
Microsoft I].
60. Id. at 1190.
61. Id.
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while the regular employees dealt with the payroll department. 62 Despite these efforts to distinguish the two types of workers, in 1989 and
1990, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that "freelancers" were actually common law employees. 63 Microsoft reacted vigorously to these rulings, terminating the employment relationship with
its freelancers and offering them an option to continue their work as
employees of an employment agency that Microsoft set up.' Most of
the freelancers accepted the offer and were converted to "temporary
agency employees," although they continued to perform exactly the
same work.65 Even though these employees had originally signed a
form stating that they were "independent contractors" and thus not
eligible for benefits, after their conversion they sued Microsoft for
benefits, mainly a company-assisted Savings Plus Plan (SPP), a section
401(k) retirement plan, and stock option eligibility (an Employee
Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP)). 66 The government agency administrating the plans, governed by Washington state law, accepted
Microsoft's classification of the workers and agreed that the workers
had contractually waived their rights to any benefits. 67 Following this
decision, the workers filed a class action suit that the district court
denied, basing its decision on the voluntary nature of the agreements
signed by the plaintiffs. 68 The plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 69 The court held that the plaintiffs were
common law employees for the purpose of the stock option plan and
had not waived their rights to these benefits by signing a statement
declaring them independent contractors.7 0 Eventually, Microsoft settled the case for $97 million dollars.7 1
The Ninth Circuit Court explained:
[T]he Workers were employees, who did not give up or waive their
rights to be treated like all other employees under the plans. The
Workers performed services for Microsoft under conditions which
made them employees. They did sign agreements, which declared
that they were independent contractors, but at best that declaration
was due to a mutual mistake, and we know that even Microsoft does
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1191.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1190-91. Microsoft had each temporary employee sign a document that
read: "[A]s an Independent Contractor to Microsoft, you are self-employed and are
responsible to pay all your own insurance and benefits." Id. at 1190.
67. Id. at 1191.
68. See id. at 1192.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1197.
71. Jennifer DiSabatino, Microsoft to Pay $97 Million to Settle "Permatemp" Case,
E-MAIL NEWSLETTER (Computerworld), Dec. 12, 2000, at http://www.computerworld.
com/careertopics/careers/story/0,10801,55093,00.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2003) (on
file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
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made them independent
not now seek
7 2 to assert that the label
contractors.
The court understood the personnel system of Microsoft as a way
large corporations use flexible arrangements as a means to avoid employee benefits and to increase company earnings.7 3 However, Justice
Trott, in his dissenting opinion in Microsoft I, accused the majority of
"playing analytical gymnastics" in order to fit the plaintiffs into the
desired categories.

74

By tone and by choice of words, the majority seems subtly to accuse
Microsoft of reprehensible conduct towards its workers. Microsoft
is identified as "refusing" to pay its workers fringe benefits as
though it did something wrong in creating the contractual relationships in this case. Later in the opinion the majority charges
Microsoft with "misrepresenting" to the plaintiffs their employment
status and with taking advantage of them. They clothe Microsoft
with a Dickensian anti-labor attitude. Such characterizations spring
full-bloom from the first sentence of the majority's opinion where
"avoiding payment of employee benefits" and "increasing profits"
foreshadow the negative coloration of the infidel Microsoft's role in
this drama.7 5
Similarly, Justice O'Scannlain, dissenting in Microsoft II, agreed with
Justice76Trott's accusation, claiming that this was "a simple contracts
case."

The nature of flexible work arrangements, their drive, and the question of whether they are a result of voluntary or involuntary relationships between labor and capital are at the bottom of these
adjudicatory debates. One of the most significant challenges that the
courts face in this context is applying traditional standards of employment relations to non-traditional situations. Because there are both
legitimate and illegitimate reasons for flexibility in employment relations, the law should neither aim to categorically prohibit, nor unconditionally allow the creation and implementation of multiple, flexible
arrangements. Rather, the law needs to be flexible in the treatment of
the diverse structures of economic flexibility. The legislature and the
courts must take on the difficult task of sorting out the good from the
bad, real triangulation from a dualities-in-disguise. Yet, within the existing framework of legal classification of employment relations, the
72. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter
Microsoft II]. In a subsequent settlement, Microsoft agreed to pay the permatemps
$97 million. Jennifer DiSabatino, Microsoft to Pay $97 Million to Settle "Permatemp"
Case, E-MAIL NEWSLETrER (Computerworld), Dec. 12, 2000, at http://
(last viswww.computerworld.com/careertopics/careers/story/0,10801,55093,00.html
ited Sept. 25, 2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
73. Microsoft 1, 97 F.3d at 1189.
74. Id. at 1203 (Trott, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1202 (Trott, J., dissenting).
76. Microsoft II, 120 F.3d at 1019 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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adjudicatory task is often problematic. The tension between normatively balancing these different substantive considerations through a
system that was built upon earlier understandings of a dual employment relationship is captured by the Microsoft I dissent's phrase, "analytical gymnastics."7 7 Despite the dissent's allegation that the
majority did not understand the case as it should have been-as "a
simple contract case,"7 " both the majority and the dissent operated
under the conventional assumptions of bipartite, employment contract
law.
The legal treatment of employee status is a complex web of rules,
standards, tests, categories, and classifications. The common law provides a balancing test of who is an employee, which consists of multiple factors, including: the involvement in the recruitment; the exercise
of control over the employee; the method and manner of work; control over appearance; who addresses performance problems and attendance; who is entitled to terminate the relationship; and who
supplies the tools for the job.7 9 Over the years, and in reaction to the
increasing complexities of flexible work arrangements, more factors
have been added to the test. For example, for the purposes of federal
tax classification, the IRS provides Form SS-8 that includes twenty
questions to determine the classification of an "employee," building
on the common law multi-factor test developed by the courts over
many decades."0 Because most employment statutes only contain a
circular definition of employment, that is, an employer is defined as
one with an employment relationship with an employee, while an employee is defined as a person employed by an employer, the common
law multi-factor test is often used."' The questions of status determination and the classification of the employment relationship is signifi77. Microsoft 1, 97 F.3d at 1203 (Trott, J., dissenting).
78. Microsoft 11, 120 F.3d at 1019 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
79. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989). The
Court noted the factors of the inquiry to include: the right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished; the skill required; the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship
between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and
how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax
treatment of the hired party. Id.
80. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FORM SS-8, DETERMINATION

OF EMPLOYEE WORK STATUS FOR PURPOSES OF FEDERAL EMPLOY-

(1997). See also Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751-52 (discussing the development of the common law
multi-factor test developed by the courts over many decades to determine the classification of an employee).
81. Lara Turcik, Rethinking the Weighted FactorApproach to the Employee Versus
Independent ContractorDistinctionin the Work for Hire Context, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 333, 336, 338 (2001).
MENT TAXES AND INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING
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cant for a wide range of issues including employee benefits, torts, antidiscrimination, workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, liability insurance, and intellectual property issues. The test also implicates dozens of statutes such as the Occupational Health and Safety
Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act,
the Civil Rights Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.8 2 The
application of the test often varies from statute to statute, as well as
from case to case.83 At times, each factor is given equal weight in the
balancing process; at other times, some factors are deemed more important than others.8 4 When facing a triangular relationship, the analysis becomes even more complicated.
The court in Microsoft III did not recognize the increased complexities of a triangular employment arrangement.8 In addressing the triangular relationship between the worker, the temporary agency, and
the client, the court reasoned that this relationship was "not wholly
congruent with the two-party relationship involving independent conEven if for some purposes a worker is considered an
tractors ....
employee of the agency that would not preclude his status of common
law employee of Microsoft. The two are not mutually exclusive." 8 6
However, while acknowledging that such new arrangements were
"not wholly congruent" with traditional work relations, the court used
the traditional common law test in order to classify the workers of
Microsoft, putting much weight on the notion of control.8 7 Relying on
other recent cases, the court referred to the general common law of
agency, under which "[a] servant ... permitted by his master to perform services for another may become the servant of such other in
performing the services." 8 8 In another recent case, Burrey v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co.,89 which was cited in the Microsoft III case, the
court recognized that "workers leased from an employment agency
could be the common law employees of the recipient of their services," yet the latter status would continue to be determined through
the traditional common law factors.9" The plaintiffs in Burrey worked
for a gas company as temporary employees until the company informed them that they would continue to perform the same work but
as employees of an employment agency. 9 1 Several years later, the gas
82. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
83. See Turcik, supra note 81, at 338.
84. Id. at 341; Jennifer Sutherland Lubinski, Comment, The Work for Hire Doctrine Under Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: An Artist's Fair Weather
Friend, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 119, 139 (1996).
85. Vizcaino v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Wash., 173 F.3d 713, 723 (9th Cir.
1999) [hereinafter Microsoft III].
86. Id.
87. See id. at 723-24.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 (1958).
89. 159 F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1998).
90. Microsoft III, 173 F.3d at 724.
91. Burrey, 159 F.3d at 390.
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company entered into a contract with a different agency, and consequently informed the plaintiffs that they would continue working at
the gas company as employees of the new employment agency. 92 Although the retirement and savings plans provided by the gas company
were made available to "employees" but not to "leased employees,"9 3
the court reasoned:
[Tihe determination of whether someone is a leased employee is
made after determining whether the individual is a common-law employee of the recipient. Thus, an individual who is not a commonlaw employee of the service recipient could nevertheless be a leased
employee of the service recipient. Similarly, the fact that a person is
or is not found to perform services under primary direction or control of the recipient for purposes of the employee leasing rules is not
determinative of whether the person is or is not a common-law employee of the recipient.94
In Renda v. Adam Meldrum & Anderson Co.,9 the court similarly
held that the plaintiffs, who worked for the defendant as leased employees, fell under the common law definition of employee, concluding for the purposes of plan participation under ERISA that the
leased workers could not be excluded from the retirement plan.9 6 By
contrast, in Abraham v. Exxon Corp.,9 ' the court held that an employer could bar leased employees, working in the firm through an
employment agency, from participating in the firm's ERISA plan,
since the exclusion was part of the explicit terms of the plan.98 As
demonstrated in these cases, even when the courts reach decisions
that are responsive to the needs of workers, methodologically, the
courts continue to simply use the traditional common law employee
test without exploring the complex relationship and structures of triangular employment and the possibilities and comparative advantages
of new participants and new arrangements in the labor market.
Therefore, the same analysis continues to be applied to both independent contractors and workers employed through employment
agencies.
B.

Contractual Status

The rigidity of classification efforts under the common law test, that
is, the requirement to fit into a certain category, "employee," reached
via a highly malleable labeling mechanism, is coupled with a related
tension-the double move of contract/status. Normally, employers
92. Id.
93. Id. at 391.
94. Id. at 393 (citing S. REP. No. 104-281, at 93 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1567).
95. 806 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
96. Id. at 1079, 1082, 1084.
97. 85 F.3d 1126 (5th Cir. 1996).
98. Id. at 1128, 1131.
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cannot contract out of the employment relationship. Employment
standards are mostly mandatory rather than dispositive or default requirements. While "the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract,"99 it is now usually
workers who are interested in the recognition of their status as a common law employee. Those who oppose the growing prevalence of triangular work relations fear that the move to flexible arrangements
will represent yet another shift in the pendulum from status to contract and back to status-and back to contract. The idea behind the
transition from status to contract has been the rejection of classification of people in ways that will pre-determine their rights regardless of
what they decide for themselves. Freedom of contract allows individuals to determine the terms of their relationship.
Yet, in contemporary legal regimes, each definition of the work relationship status carries with it consequences as to the social conditions, benefits, and guarantees of work. As it has been legally
developed, the determination that a relationship is one of "employment" is a status that entails crucial conditions for the work life of
laborers. Thus, the courts have engaged in the double move of contractual status. On the one hand, courts have stated once and again
that the employer's internal classification of its workers is not determinate of the status of the relationship. On the other hand, the nature
and details of the relationship determined by law is highly influenced
by the explicit and implicit understandings that exist between the different sides of the contractual relations. As we have seen, one of the
most influential factors that guide the courts' decisions is the degree to
which the triangulation has been voluntarily reached by both sides of
the employment relationship.
For example, in Microsoft III, the court determined that Microsoft
had not excluded the workers from coverage in "clear and explicit
language," and that the contract signed by the employee declaring
them "independent contractors" was not to be accepted.10 0 The result
is that a contract that misclassifies the employment relationship and
contains, alongside the misclassification, a waiver of certain eligibilities is less likely to be upheld by a court than a contract that simply
contains the same waiver of eligibilities without classifying the
relationship.
The proliferation of legally recognized arrangements, statuses, and
terminology coupled with a multi-factor, balancing test allows the
99. HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (Charles M. Harr ed., Beacon Press 1963)
(1861). This is not unique to labor, and similar patterns appear in marriage law and in
housing law. See Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment. From
Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47, 47-48 (1978); Hiram H.
Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective:From Status to Contractand Back
in 900 Years?, 9 KAN. L. REV. 369, 369, 377 (1961).
100. Microsoft III, 173 F.3d at 723.
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courts to reach context-sensitive decisions. Similarly, the doublemove of contractual status-the recognition that employment relations are reached through contract, coupled with the insistence that
status is not to be opted out from by contract-all attempt to mediate
between the need for flexibility of the market and the need for employee protection and accountability. At the same time, these moves
produce a different kind of flexibility that is not adequately accounted
for in the context of emerging triangular relations in the new
economy.
Even in a conventional dual relationship, the existing regulatory
and adjudicatory structures have proven inadequate in ensuring socially responsible practices in the new world of work. Referred to by
one scholar as "simulated statutory purposelessness," the existing
common law test does not effectively address the diversity of arrangements and the purposes of these arrangements in the current market. 101 Indeed, the doctrine is often a "denial of socioeconomic
purpose," rather than an acknowledgment of multiple dynamically
shifting market realities for unequally situated individuals."0 2 The existing legal regime carries with it uncertainty, along with an uneven
ability of business and workers to impact future results. The common
law multi-factor test produces unpredictable results and is prone to
manipulation by those who can plan ahead and make ex-ante legal
information available to them. For these reasons, labor scholars often
predict that victorious decisions for labor such as the Microsoft decision will not have a long lasting effect.' 0 3 In these cases in which decisions have been reached in a highly contextual manner, costs are
likely to find a way to the entity with less bargaining power in any
case."0 n Moreover, such decisions can be understood as further pushing the institutional learning of employers and of the employment
agency industry, simply making them better at explicitly excluding
contingent employees from certain rights and eligibilities. Thus, the
legal proliferation of categories produces a flexibility of which some
actors will be better situated to take advantage of.
The current contractual status hybrid result is inconsistent with the
objectives of social legislation. If the purpose of protective employment laws is to ensure that workers, as weaker players in the market,
will receive fair and reasonable compensation for their work, the focus
on the right to control coupled with the title status definitions of the
individual firm fails to reach those who are most likely to need such
101. Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor
Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21
CoMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 187, 227 (1999).
102. Id. at 187.
103. See Mark Berger, The Contingent Employee Benefits Problem, 32 IND. L. REV.
301, 324 (1999).
104. See id.
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protection. Ad hoc, case-by-case decisions enable courts to draw the
links between the actual user of labor and the protected class despite a
third-party intermediary. As such, the law pierces the veil of the intermediaries by rejecting some of the classifications emerging in efforts to produce economic flexibility. At the same time, the
development of this legal flexibility contributes to the constitution of
the veil of uncertainty. The law contributes to the industry-designed
complexity by accepting some of the classifications construed by the
industry, by advancing new categories through ad hoc, case-by-case
adjudication, and by layering the imaginative spectrum with additional
mechanisms that ensure some accountability while producing other
ways for the industry to opt-out of legally binding requirements.
In addition to the benefit eligibility cases described above, courts
are currently facing these problems in a wide variety of contexts. Recent cases have dealt with the triangulation of work relations from
several aspects in employment and labor law. For example, for the
purposes of preventing employment discrimination under Title VII,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has recently concluded that under most circumstances of triangular relationships, both the user-employer and the employment agency can be held
liable for discrimination or harassment suffered by temporary employees. 10 5 For collective bargaining purposes, the National Labor Relations Board has ruled that it is permissible to compose a bargaining
unit consisting of employees who are employed through an employment agency (described in the case as a "temporary supplier firm")
together with employees who are directly employed by the user-employer,10 6 as "long as the two groups share a sufficient community of
interests."1 °7 Again, labor scholars fear that this decision may well be
short-lived without the introduction of more comprehensive legal responses to these new issues.' 0 8
C.

The Dunlop Commission and Recent Policy Proposals

In the 1994 final report of the Dunlop Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, the commission recognized that the
"single most important factor in determining which workers are covered by employment and labor statutes is the way the line is drawn
between employees and independent contractors." ' 10 9 Yet, the com105. U.S.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

DANCE: APPLICATION OF

EEOC

OPPORTUNITY

COMM'N,

ENFORCEMENT

Gui-

LAWS TO CONTINGENT WORKERS PLACED BY TEM-

PORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER STAFFING

FIRMs (1997), at http://
www.eeoc.gov/docs/conting.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (on file with the Texas
Wesleyan Law Review).
106. M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1305, 1303 (2000).
107. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 456-57 (2000).
108. Id. at 456-57.
109. DUNLOP COMM'N, supra note 28, at 37.
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mission described the existing common law test as providing employers with "a means and incentive to circumvent the employment
policies of the nation."1 1 The incentives are to avoid costs and overcome limiting public regulation; the means is to use some form of the
diverse range of flexible work arrangements that exist in the new
economy. " ' The commission reasoned that the test for defining employee status "is based on a nineteenth-century concept whose purposes are wholly unrelated to contemporary employment policy.""' 2
Therefore, the commission recommended the legislative adoption of a
single economic reality standard to be applied in determining the coverage of employment and labor laws. 1 3
Questions about the classification of certain groups of workers
should constantly be linked in public policy debates to the reach of
protective legislation for nontraditional employees. As the Dunlop
Commission suggested, a significant move in this direction could be
the "economic realities" test to determine employee status, or rather
to determine eligibilities, "as a matter of economic reality follows the
usual path of an employee and is dependent on the business which he
serves."1 1 4 During the past years, the courts have mostly been reluctant to replace the common law test with the economic realities test in
ascertaining employee status under employment statutes.11 5 Yet, the
economic realities test seems more capable of dealing with the competing and complex factors for determining rights and responsibilities
in the new economy. The economic reality test is also more congruent
with the emergence of a spectrum of triangular employment arrangements. While the common law test, which focuses primarily on the
issue of control, assumes a dual relationship and thus looks for the one
firm which is most fit to be labeled "employer," the economic realities
test asks about the economic dependency of the worker within the
structure she or he is employed. Thus, in a triangular relationship,
economic dependency can be spread upon both the user-employer
and the employment agency and determined according to the different benefits and claims at stake. The economic realities test can ask
questions about the comparative advantage of each of the potential
employers-the user-employer and the employment agency-in their
activities vis-A-vis workers.
The court in Microsoft, as well as in other recent cases, did not adequately account for the diverse nature of factors and incentives that
lead to flexible employment relations. Rather, these decisions mostly
110. Id. at 37-38.
111. Befort, supra note 107, at 419.
112. DUNLOP COMM'N, supra note 28, at 37.
113. Id. at 36.
114. Myra H. Barron, Who's an Independent Contractor? Who's an Employee?, 14
LAB. LAW. 457, 466 (1999) (citation omitted).
115. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992).
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focus on the conventional dichotomies and balances between contract
and status restricted by the idea of a conventional dual-sided relationship. The potential and risks emerging from triangular relationships
have rarely been explored by the case law in a sustained manner. The
continuing dominance of a dual contractual relationship in employment relationships limits the understanding of both the downside and
the possible benefits of the employment agency industries. Moreover,
the inconsistency of the case law creates uncertainty for both employers and workers and results in inefficiencies for all actors in the new
economy.
The complex economic and social nature of the changing employment relations requires a comprehensive rethinking of the substantive
rights and eligibilities that firms owe to those whose services they employ. Courts should recognize the existing practices that distinguish
between different types of employment agencies, different motivators
of flexible arrangements, and variances in contingent practices. The
continuing predominance of the centuries-long common law employment test is insufficiently geared to account for new triangular employment relations. Hence, along with the introduction of the
economic realities test in adjudication, specific regulations of employment agencies, and administrative guidelines as to employment agencies' treatment are key to addressing the new complexities of
triangular work relations. Currently, there is no federal law that regulates the responsibilities and roles of private for-profit employment
agencies and their relationships with both workers and user-employers. 11 6 Many of these questions are also largely unregulated at the
state levels. Even when regulated by state law, current regulation
lacks a comprehensive treatment of the complexities of the different
categories, roles, and interactions that exist today in triangular work
relations." 7 Several recent bills have been introduced in the House of
Representatives, each dealing with the problematic nature of flexible
work arrangements.11 8 These legislative initiatives as well as others
116. Freeman, supra note 40 (manuscript at 2, 5). In addition to implicating employment agencies as sharing in the responsibilities of employers, some scholars have
suggested, for example, that these new entities should be reclassified as a new form of
labor organization, functionally equivalent to the older form of a union hiring hall.
Id.
117. See supra Part II.
118. See H.R. 1525, 106th Cong. (1999) (the Independent Contractor Clarification
Act of 1999, an effort to provide simplified rules for determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor); H.R. 2298, 106th Cong. (1999) (the
Equity for Temporary Workers Act of 1999, which would prohibit any discrimination
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment against
any temporary employee); H.R. 2299, 106th Cong. (1999) (the ERISA Clarification
Act of 1999, which would amend ERISA to require employer to include all service
(including service as a temporary worker) in determining an employee's years of service and would require that any exclusion from a pension plan be made on a uniform
basis, that it be stated in the plan, and that it be based on a reasonable job classification and on objective criteria). An employer would not be allowed to exclude work-

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol10/iss1/8
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V10.I1.6

24

Slipperiness
of Stability: Contracting
for Flexible and Trian
SLIPPERINESS
OF STABILITY
2003] Lobel: TheTHE

must be debated in the public arena. A revitalized employment law
needs to be introduced to concepts of tri-party responsibilities. As
described previously in part III, new intermediaries in the market
have the potential to enhance the stability in the market at the same
time that they enable flexibility. 19 For example, employment agencies have the potential of helping to increase the portability of benefits
in a reality of contingency. Thus, they can provide the needed institutional continuity for mobile workers to accumulate benefits such as
health and retirement plans. Yet, to do so responsibly, public policy
must consider the ways in which the provision of benefits could be
prorated among the various employing entities, including new forprofit intermediaries.12 0
D.

Comparative Insights

Finally, the comparative perspective provides some helpful insights
into the need for legal innovation when facing these new dynamic realities. It should be noted that around the world, even countries with
a higher commitment to extensive labor standards than the United
States are undergoing flexiblization processes. 121 Indeed, even the labor-oriented strong historic stance of the International Labor Organization (ILO) against employment agencies, and its skeptical view of
non-standard forms of employment, was partly reversed in 1997, by
the adoption of a new convention on employment agencies, replacing
the 1949 treaty that had endured until then.1 22 The old convention
generally restricted the roles of employment agencies to only two activities: worker recruitment and placement. 2 3 In contrast, the new
"Convention Concerning Private Employment Agencies" expands the
roles of employment agencies as employers, regulates a broader range
ers from a pension plan by designating the employee as a part-time, temporary,
leased, or agency employee where the employee is actually a common law employee
of the employer and has served the required minimum service period under the plan.
See H.R. 2299.
119. See supra Part III.
120. Befort, supra note 107, at 459 ("Contingent work arrangements are not likely
to decrease in the foreseeable future and trying to prevent their use is likely to be a
futile endeavor. By increasing the portability of benefits, the law can accommodate
rather than obstruct the prevalence of these nonstandard work arrangements."); see
generally The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1181-82 (1994 & Supp. 111996) (illustrating how provision of benefits for employees could be handled).
121. See generally Aaron B. Sukert, Marionettes of Globalization: A Comparative
Analysis of Legal Protectionsfor Contingent Workers in the InternationalCommunity,
27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 431 (2000) (discussing increased flexible work arrangements throughout European and other industralized nations).
122. See The Convention Concerning Private Employment Agencies, Convention
C181, 1997, at http://www.ilo.ogr/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm (last vistited Oct. 25,
2003) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
123. See id.
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of their activities, and requires countries to allocate responsibilities to
both the employment agencies and the user-employers.
At the European Union level, the European Employment Strategy
committee has indicated that one of its goals is the achievement of
"flex-security" for European workplaces. 124 Many countries, including the social-democratic Scandinavian countries are rethinking their
legal regimes to accommodate flexible employment arrangements.
For example, Sweden has implemented a dramatic change in its laws;
in 1993, it enacted the Act on Private Employment Exchange and Hiring Out of Employees.1 25 The "law marks the end of an extremely
restrictive regulatory" regime that lasted nearly sixty years and removed virtually all restrictions on flexible employment arrangements.1 26 At the same time that countries are liberating their laws to
enable flexible arrangements, they are developing new legal categories and mechanisms for the inclusion of new arrangements within the
radar of social legislation. Thus, the comparative perspective can provide directions for reform.
For example, in Canada a new legal category, "dependent contractor," is developing under which individuals who do not fall under the
traditional "employee" definitions but are nonetheless in such a relationship with "the business for which they perform services that they
should be accorded the same protections and other economic rights as
employees." '2 7 In Germany, a similar category of "employee-like persons" are defined as employees for the purpose of many employment
and labor law provisions because "[t]hey are economically dependent
and are in similar need of social protection.' 1 28 Similarly, Sweden has
developed a category of dependent employees and has regulated the
129
relationships among leasing firms, user employers, and workers.
These shifts demonstrate the tensions between the need to recognize
the expanding existence of triangular employment arrangements, to
provide regulatory incentives that will motivate fair and socially responsible arrangements, and to limit illegitimate structures that defy
public policy.
124. David M. Trubek & James S. Mosher, New Governance, Employment Policy,
and the European Social Model, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW
ECONOMY 33, 41-42 (Jonathan Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003).
125. Reinhold Fahlbeck, Flexibility: Potential and Challenges for Labor Law, 19
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 515, 522 (1998).
126. Id.
127. Marsha S. Berzon, Employer Evasion of Collective Bargainingand Employee
Protective Statutes Through Independent ContractorStatus, 13 LAB. L. EXCHANGE 1,
12 (1994) (alteration in original).
128. Wolfgang Daubler, Working People in Germany, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y. J.
77, 88 (1999).
129. See Ronnie Eklund, A Look at Contract Labor in the Nordic Countries, 18
CoMP. LAB. L.J. 229, 240-42, 249, 251-52 (1997).
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CONCLUSION

Flexible employment relations are becoming a reality for many individuals in the new world of work. In such a reality, the traditional
employer is no longer the single significant, and often not even the
primary, actor of the labor market. Social reform efforts to improve
working conditions and employability are shifting to other actors. Increasingly, private for-profit intermediaries, such as employment
agencies, serve important roles in shaping the economy and determining the nature of labor relations. An exploration of the development
and function of flexible employment arrangements reveals the ways in
which seemingly efficiency driven arrangements and categories are developed through continuous political and legal action. Third-party
employment agencies have the potential of becoming welfare-enhancing and socially responsible actors. However, they are also likely to
produce new forms of mistreatment and exclusion in the absence of
adequate regulatory incentives. New economic structures in the labor
market necessitate the development of a new normative model for fair
and just employment relationships that enables flexibility while preserving the social values that underlie our tradition of employment
policy.
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